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Ireland’s economic boom from 1994 to 2000 (from which the term ‘Celtic Tiger’ was 
coined) has generated an extensive academic literature debating its causes, impacts and 
consequences. While an initial reading emphasised that economic transformation had 
been achieved through market liberalisation (Barry, 1999; Sweeney, 1999; Clinch, 
Convery and Walsh, 2002), this was soon contested by a literature that focused more on 
the crucial role played by the state. Scholars at the influential Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI) argued that ‘there was a great deal more to Ireland’s success 
than liberalization of markets. The state has been deeply implicated in the entire process, 
managing both economic development and the welfare state’ (Nolan, O’Connell and 
Whelan, 2000: 3). They conclude that ‘it is not a simple story of globalization, forced 
withdrawal of the state and the promotion of neo-liberalism’ (ibid.: 1). Ó Riain (2000, 
2004) applied to the Irish state the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ taken from Evans 
(1995) and he characterised it as a ‘flexible developmental state’ in contrast to the 
bureaucratic developmental states of East Asia, arguing that this constitutes a new model 
of state-led development that is more responsive to the demands and pressures of 
globalisation. His later work slightly amended the concept to that of a Developmental 
Network State (DNS) as ‘network centrality is critical to this new state – isolation from 
the local or the global renders it ineffective’ (2004: 4). While contested by  O’Hearn 
(2000) and Kirby (2002), the concept of the developmental state was adopted by the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in its 2003 tri-annual statement of the 
state’s economic and social strategy and used as the basis for proposing a Developmental 
Welfare State (DWS) for Ireland (NESC, 2003: 29-33; 2005a, 2005b).  
 
In critiquing the adequacy of the concept of the developmental state for the Irish case, 
Kirby (2002, 2005) argued that the concept of competition state describes more 
accurately the nature and operation of the Irish state in the era of the Celtic Tiger since it 
prioritises goals of economic competitiveness over those of social cohesion and welfare. 
Following Kirby, Dukelow also adopts the concept of competition state for the Irish case 
as ‘the state has taken a selective interventionist role in the manner of a competition state 
to re-orient social security policy to enhance economic competitiveness by tackling 
unemployment, yet leaving levels of income inequality and poverty remain relatively 
high’ (2004: 27). Boyle, though seemingly unaware that the concept had already been 
introduced into debates on the Irish state, baldly states: ‘Contemporary Ireland is an 
exemplar of the competition state, where social policy is subordinated to the needs of the 
economy’ (2005: 16). Meanwhile, the competition state concept was itself criticised by Ó 
Riain since it ‘unnecessarily narrows our understanding of the institutions underpinning 
economic growth’ and obscures ‘the existence of a political space for struggles within 
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and through existing institutions over how development could and should be structured’ 
(2004: 18).  
 
Understanding the institutional underpinnings of the Celtic Tiger, therefore, has given 
rise to two competing conceptions of the state. Is the contemporary Irish state a new type 
of developmental state thereby holding lessons of successful development for many other 
states, or is it a competition state, an exemplar of how globalisation resituates the state so 
that it prioritises the needs of global capital over those of its own citizens? The purpose of 
this paper is to take this debate further. The paper begins by elaborating further what is 
meant by the competition state, broadening the treatment beyond the Irish case and 
linking it to the political economy of development under the conditions of today’s 
globalisation. The paper then tests the concept of the competition state empirically 
through examining the changing nature of Ireland’s social security regime and analysing 
the features and actors of the Irish state that help account for the particular outcomes 
observed. The paper concludes by summarising the argument, emphasising the role of 
state agency in the changes identified and raising a key question about the future 
direction of the Irish state.  
 
The approach taken in this paper seeks to overcome a number of limitations of the 
competition state concept and, more generally, of political economy approaches to 
theorising the state, as identified by Phillips (2005). She identifies economism (namely a 
concentration on state economic policy and strategies) and a functionalist bias (namely 
understanding the form of state as an outcome of its adaptation to the challenges of 
economic globalisation) as characterising these approaches. This bias, according to 
Phillips, results in a ‘generalized failure to consider or advance clear understandings of 
the processes by which outcomes are produced’ (2005: 103) so that politics, in the sense 
of ‘variation, contingency and specificity in the institutional structures of states, the 
nature of state strategies and the types of state-society linkages that prevail in particular 
political economies’ is largely missing (ibid: 110; emphasis in original). In choosing to 
focus on an aspect of the state’s social policy rather than on its economic strategies and in 
seeking to explain in quite some detail what accounts for the outcomes observed, it is 
intended that this paper break new ground in political economy analyses of how the state 
is adapting to the pressures of globalisation. 
 
Globalisation and the competition state 
Whereas the developmental state concept emerged from analysing the ways in which 
certain developing states (in East Asia and in Latin America) succeeded in building a 
modern and competitive industrial economy, the competition state concept emerged from 
analysing the ways in which developed industrial states were restructuring themselves in 
response to the constraints and opportunities opened up by neoliberal globalisation in the 
1990s. Already, even before a new international context shaped by globalisation had 
emerged, the national compact between capital and labour that characterised such states 
(the Keynesian welfare state or KWS as it was often called) was under pressure from 
internal factors. Recession in the 1970s focused attention on the expense of maintaining 
generous welfare states and analysts began to see them as putting a fetter on economic 
success due both to their high cost and to their rigidities (protection for labour, high 
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taxes, lack of incentives). While these pressures originally derived from within, by the 
1980s and 1990s pressures deriving from outside were also being recognised, such as 
those of international competitiveness, the mobility of capital worldwide and intensified 
international trade (Pierson, 2004:100-102). A central cause has been the impact of new 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) which have made possible both the 
more intense and immediate global interconnectedness that drives finance, production 
and trade and also new forms of corporate organisation that have come to dominate more 
and more key production chains worldwide, thereby strengthening the power of global 
market forces as against that of national state authorities. As Ruggie has recognised, the 
globalisation of financial markets and production chains challenged the premises on 
which the grand bargain between capital and labour rested since that bargain presupposed 
a world in which the state could effectively mediate external impacts through such tools 
as tariffs and exchange rates (Ruggie, 2003: 94). In this situation, welfare states have not 
collapsed in the way that communist and developing states did but they are under 
pressure to reduce costs and erode the level and extent of protection they previously 
provided (Mishra, 1999; Scharpf, 2000). This global context, therefore, has created new 
pressures to which all states have to respond. It is out of analysing the ways in which 
states are responding that the concept of the competition state emerged. 
 
Various attempts have been made to characterise the new regime that is emerging as a 
successor to the Keynesian welfare state. Jessop sees this ‘new state form’ as a 
Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS) which seeks ‘to strengthen as far as possible the 
structural competitiveness of the national economy by intervening on the supply-side; 
and to subordinate social policy to the needs of labour market flexibility and/or to the 
constraints of international competition’ (Jessop, 1994: 24). In his work, Cerny describes 
the emergence of a ‘competition state’ out of the tensions between the demands of 
economic globalisation and the embedded state/society practices that characterised the 
national welfare state as the priorities of policy move away from the general 
maximisation of public welfare (full employment, redistributive transfer payments and 
social service provision) to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in 
both private and public sectors. These reactions, however, follow no set pattern or master 
plan: ‘The emerging embedded neoliberal consensus is therefore not simply a developing 
“from outside” or “from above”; it is also a political construction promoted by political 
entrepreneurs who must design projects, convince others, build coalitions and ultimately 
win some sort of political legitimacy “from inside” and “from below”’(Cerny, Menz and 
Soederberg, 2005: 19). Tracing this process as they see it happening in western European 
states and the European Union itself, in North America and New Zealand, in Latin 
America and in eastern European countries, they identify a process that is ‘almost without 
exception elite-driven …. based on sustained support from converted academics, policy 
advisers and consultants both within and outside the public sector, government officials, 
and firms and other economic actors, especially representatives of employers and 
business organisations, and, especially consumers and many taxpayers (ibid.: 22-23). 
What can be observed, therefore, ‘is not so much the continuity or maintenance of older 
“varieties of capitalism”, but rather the emergence of varieties of neoliberalism – of 
diversity within convergence, of the forging of different “roads to globalization”. … 
States are increasingly becoming “competition states”’ (ibid.: 21, 22; emphasis in 
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original). This belies any easy claim that the state is retreating or that its role is 
marginalised in the political economy of today’s globalised world order. Rather, what is 
happening is the redefinition of its core activities as it adapts to the new global 
environment in which it operates. This helps make sense of what otherwise may seem a 
contradiction between the state’s ever weakening ability to secure the welfare of its 
citizens while on the other hand it becomes ever more intrusive in the life of the national 
economy such as, for example, through a myriad of new regulatory agencies. As Cerny et 
al. point out: ‘Deregulation was never really deregulation; it increasingly became the 
replacement of outcome-orientated and discretionary interventionism with new market 
friendly regulations – a form of pro-market re-regulation. Indeed, in many cases the new 
regulations were more complex and onerous than the old type. A well known example is 
that of insider trading regulation in financial markets, almost unknown (except in the US) 
before the 1980s’ (ibid.: 17-18; emphasis in original). 
 
Following Cerny, therefore, the emerging model can be characterised as one in which 
state actors, both politicians and bureaucrats, react to the pressures of the global market 
by ‘promoting the competitive advantages of particular production and service sectors in 
a more open and integrated world economy’ (Cerny, 2000a: 22). In this situation, state 
actions ‘are often designed to enforce global market rational economic and political 
behaviour on rigid and inflexible private sector actors as well as on state actors and 
agencies. The institutions and practices of the state itself are increasingly marketized or 
“commodified”, and the state becomes the spearhead of structural transformation to 
market norms both at home and abroad’. As a result, ‘the actual amount or weight of 
government imbrication in social life can increase … at the same time the power of the 
state to control specific activities and market outcomes continues to diminish’ 
undermining the ‘overall strategic and developmental capacity’ of state agencies (ibid.: 
30-34; emphasis in original). Indeed, this situation results in ‘the splintering of the state 
itself’ as ‘state actors themselves, once said to be “captured” by large, well-organized 
domestic constituencies, are increasingly captured instead by transnationally-linked 
sectors which set state agencies against each other as in the desire to “level the playing 
field” for their domestic clients in the wider world’ (Cerny, 2002: 11). Many 
domestically oriented interest and pressure groups are increasingly marginalised in the 
formulation of policy while transnationally linked groups not only gain influence but also 
can play state actors off against one another. Cerny concludes: ‘The crucial point … is 
that those tasks, roles and activities [of states] will not just be different, but will lose 
much of the overarching, macro-political character traditionally ascribed to the effective 
state, the good state or the just state’ (2000a: 23).  
 
More fully and adequately than does any other characterisation of the state, the 
‘competition state’ best interprets the changing nature of governance in the Irish case. 
Four ways in which it does this can be identified: 
1) It accounts for the fact that, far from retreating and weakening under the impact of 
globalisation, the Irish state has become much more active and extensive. As 
Taylor recognises, ‘Irish political institutions have altered radically in response to 
the pressures of competing in the global economy’ and ‘this has involved a 
fundamental shift in the nature of governance, since economic management has 
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not been left solely to the market or to the state’ (Taylor, 2005: 5). This contrasts 
therefore with the account offered both by neo-classical economists (Barry, 1999; 
Walsh, 1996) and by radical critics (O’Hearn, 1998; Allen, 2000) who give the 
key role to the free market in accounting for Ireland’s economic success, though 
both groups evaluate it very differently. 
2) In contrast to the concept of the ‘developmental state’, it accounts for the 
profound ambiguities that characterise the state’s relationship to society as its 
capacity to win high levels of foreign direct investment in key targeted sectors 
contrasts with its low social spending. As the NESC put it, commenting on data 
that show a clear positive correlation between levels of social spending and 
economic performance across the EU 15: ‘Ireland, however, is the country whose 
relative wealth is the least guide to the relative level of is social spending’ (NESC, 
2005a: 108).  
3) While such ambiguities have to be seen by developmental state theorists as 
contradictions – state capacity in one sector contrasts with the lack of capacity in 
another – for the competition state theorist the contrast between economic success 
and social failure derives from the central logic that informs state actions – the 
imposition of competitive pressures on the economy and on society. In writing 
about Irish welfare reform, Taylor identifies that ‘its principal motivation has 
rested firmly upon enhancing the flexibility of the labour market’ rather than upon 
extending social rights (Taylor, 2005: 94).   
4) While there may be a central logic of economic competitiveness informing state 
actions, this logic also results in the fragmentation of state actions (‘the 
splintering of the state itself’ as described by Cerny) as the state gives power and 
resources to different agencies to achieve key elements of public policy with little 
coordination between them. The effectiveness of the Industrial Development 
Agency (IDA) in winning foreign direct investment has received extensive 
attention in this regard (see Mac Sharry and White, 2000); yet Boyle draws 
attention to the role of FÁS, the state’s labour market agency, which offered the 
possibility of addressing a myriad of problems cheaply and effectively, 
increasingly by-passing other government departments and agencies in doing so. 
Reflecting the ‘pragmatic-populist streak in Irish politics’ this has tended to deal 
with symptoms while neglecting the deeper roots of problems, offering ‘cheap, 
flexible solutions that avoided long-term commitments’ (Boyle, 2005: 113-14). 
 
In these ways, the competition state concept is the most adequate to characterise the 
contemporary Irish state. However, Ó Riain has raised three criticisms of the concept that 
deserve attention. He writes that it extends ‘important observations about the specific 
features of many contemporary capitalist states into too general an argument regarding a 
new mode of capitalist regulation’. In doing this, it ‘does not capture the empirical 
complexity of uneven development in contemporary capitalism and unnecessarily 
narrows our understanding of the institutions underpinning economic growth’ (Ó Riain, 
2004: 18). This criticism rests on a claim central to developmental state theorists, namely 
that ‘some economies have been able to move up the hierarchy of the international 
division of labour and increase national income levels’ (ibid.: 21) which is Ó Riain’s 
primary definition of development. He claims that the concept of the developmental state 
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better captures this potential of the state whereas the concept of the competition state 
neglects such potential. Of all his criticisms, this is the most important and central one. 
To some extent, the difference between both concepts in this regard rests on different 
understandings of what constitutes development. For Ó Riain treats social development 
as being analytically distinct from economic development; his claim for Ireland being a 
developmental state rests entirely on the role it has played in transforming the nature of 
the economy. Competition state theorists also acknowledge that neoliberal public 
policies, as Cerny et al. put it, ‘do not merely constrain but also bring opportunities. 
Contemporary politics entails both a process of choosing between different versions of 
neoliberalism and the attempt to innovate creatively within the new neoliberal playing 
field’ (2005: 20; emphasis in original). This seems a far more accurate way of 
characterising the Irish state’s success in a small number of productive sectors of the 
economy than does Ó Riain’s rather more sweeping generalisation of this as 
developmental success. Indeed, the very weakness of the developmental state concept is 
that it is far too blunt an instrument to capture the ambiguous nature of what the state is 
able to achieve in the conditions of neo-liberal globalisation. 
 
Ó Riain’s second criticism is that the competition state concept fails to recognise ‘the 
internally contradictory nature of “market liberalism” itself’. ‘Far from being smoothly 
integrated with market competitiveness, the institutions supporting capitalist development 
need to be protected from excessive marketization of the institutions of the economy, 
particularly the growing financialization of its firms and institutions’ (Ó Riain, 2004: 18). 
This is a rather more puzzling criticism as it makes an abstract point that in no way 
contradicts any aspect of the competition state concept. One can fully agree with Ó 
Riain’s claim here while holding that the intense competitive conditions of today’s 
neoliberal capitalism are eroding the ability of public institutions to play the essential role 
he posits. If there were disagreement on this point, it would be on the empirical issue of 
whether this is happening rather than on any theoretical difference between proponents of 
the competition and developmental state. The third criticism raised by Ó Riain is that the 
competition state concept obscures ‘the existence of a political space for struggles within 
and through existing institutions over how development could and should be structured’ 
and it ignores ‘the many political possibilities that the institutions of economic 
development present for future transformation’ (2004: 18). What here distinguishes 
proponents of each of the concepts is the potential for transformation that exists. For, as 
made clear above, competition state theorists also recognise that politics matters and that 
it results in different outcomes in different states – ‘different versions of neoliberalism’. 
Ó Riain goes further in claiming that spaces exist for going beyond neoliberalism to 
social democracy and his book ends by outlining what this might entail (ibid.: 237-42). 
Here again what is at issue is more empirical than theoretical: Cerny et al. (2005) outline 
at some length the erosion of the basis for a social democratic alternative as it is 
happening in practice in many parts of the world whereas Ó Riain’s account is limited to 
a purely theoretical outline of what such an alternative might look like while neglecting 
entirely the political or social bases for its emergence. On the contrary, he acknowledges 
that the developmental state ‘will face an increasingly contentious politics of national 
inequality because unequal integration into the globalization project undermines 
solidaristic national social contracts’ (2004: 38); however, he fails to address how it 
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might overcome these to build a more social democratic alternative. In this situation, 
therefore, the onus rests on those who claim that such a possibility exists to show in 
practice how it might emerge or how it is emerging. Failure to do this undermines this 
criticism of the competition state. 
 
Recommodification ‘Irish-style’ 
A major weakness of competition state theory is that it has been developed largely in the 
abstract, with little empirical application or testing. Since the competition state prioritises 
economic competitiveness over social cohesion and welfare through subordinating the 
latter to the logic of the former, it follows that empirical examination of how Ireland’s 
social security regime has changed over the past two decades offers evidence to test the 
applicability of the competition state to Ireland. This is the purpose of this section. Four 
indicators of social security recommodifcation are examined in turn – regulation, 
retrenchment, residualisation, and activation/conditionality. These competition state 
indicators are developed based on the work of Cerny and Jessop and reflect how, in the 
competition state model, the role of the state and governance shift, while fiscal policy 
becomes more neo-liberal, resulting in greater vulnerability and inequality and a tendency 
to rely more on the market to provide public and private goods. The indicators are also 
applicable to other areas of policy like health, housing or education. Testing each 
indicator highlights where Irish social security policy is consistent with or deviates from 
movement towards a competition state. However, competition state theory also stresses 
political agency and the role played by domestic institutions and practices, national and 
international interest groups and the evolving relationship between the public and private 
in determining policy choices (Cerny et al., 2005: 19-20). Hence, we analyse how these 
factors manifest themselves in the Irish case, helping account for the distinctive outcomes 
observed. We end by highlighting a fundamental challenge facing those who seek more 
egalitarian outcomes even within the confines of the Irish competition state.     
 
The social security characteristics of a competition state can be described as follows: 
domestic social security policy is subordinated to the economic needs of international 
competitiveness. Low levels of taxation and wage moderation limit the state’s capacity to 
fund social security more generously and create pressure for public-sector spending cuts.  
Public goods, especially those related to social justice and redistribution, are increasingly 
privatised or subject to profit criteria. Their distribution becomes more consumer driven 
and less based on rights derived from citizenship. Increased women’s labour market 
participation impacts on the capacity of families to provide welfare and results in the 
greater reliance on market-based provision of both child and elder care.  Fiscal pressures 
cause shifts to more targeted means-tested social protection. Reliance on targeted and 
ungenerous transfer payments increases the depth of poverty and widens income 
inequalities. There are new forms of inequality where those with weak capacity to 
participate in the labour market suffer most in the ‘pauperization of segments of society’ 
(Cerny et al., 2005: 29). The welfare system becomes more active, productivist and 
oriented to employment. Public investment focuses on enhancing labour supply through 
learning and training. Rights become conditionally linked to the obligation to participate 
in the labour market. Supportive carrots and punitive sanctions both encourage and 
compel labour market participation. (Cerny et al., 2005: 18). The recommodification of 
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social security occurs as ‘redistributive’ welfare is transformed into ‘productivist’ 
workfare policy. We have developed the following typology to summarise this 
recommodification:1
 
• Regulation: The function of the state changes. New public management 
regulatory frameworks enable governments ‘to steer but not row’ (Cerny et al., 
2005: 17). New forms of governance lead to the delegation of policy to new 
actors at national and other levels. This empowers business and professional 
technical elites. Privatisation of provision occurs either directly or by organising 
public service delivery around commercial or market consumer principles.  
• Retrenchment: The prioritisation of international competitiveness results in a 
‘low tax, low inflation’ fiscal policy as expressed and supervised in the EU’s 
Growth and Stability Pact. Fiscal pressures lead countries to resort to short-term 
cost cutting and long-term cost containment and cost avoidance.  
• Residualisation: In order to decrease welfare recipients’ dependence on the state, 
employment is prioritised as a route out of poverty at the expense of redistributive 
and egalitarian objectives. The focus on maintaining low welfare rates to promote 
work incentives has inegalitarian implications for those who cannot exercise 
employment routes out of poverty. Non-labour market participants including the 
elderly, people with disabilities and those involved in ‘caring’ duties at home are 
more vulnerable in the increasing relative gulf between the rich and poor.     
• Activation/conditionality: Passive income maintenance shifts to active spending 
on training and education. Welfare is reinvented into ‘workfare’ where income 
support is more conditional and linked to obligations to participate in the labour 
market. Positive encouragement coexists with punitive sanctions. Increased labour 
market participation of women weakens family capacity resulting in the greater 
commodification of caring functions. 
 
How each of these four indicators applies to the Irish case is now reviewed. The review  
shows that Irish social security trends have moved in a direction consistent with the 
competition state indicators. However, this has happened in a distinctive way and it is 
highlighted throughout how particular policies were mediated through Irish political 
institutions, ideology and culture. The end result is a particular ‘Irish style’ 
recommodification. 
 
Regulation 
Competition state theory stresses the transformation of the role of the state and changes in 
the nature of governance. Here we examine trends in regulation, shifts in power to 
international capital and business, an emerging international policy community, 
privatisation and new public management, as they have occurred in Ireland’s social 
security policy community.  
                                                 
1 The authors developed these indicators. The retrenchment and activation/conditionality indicators are 
central to competition state theory but also used by other political economists (Pierson, 2001). The 
residualisation indicator and regulation indicator are more specific to competition state theory.   
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A regulatory state ‘should provide a working framework of rules and performance 
indicators or targets for market actors to follow’ (Cerny et al., 2005: 17). Historically 
Ireland has been a mixed economy welfare state but social security has been an almost 
exclusive statutory responsibility.  Over the last two decades the state has made some 
attempts to divest itself of social security responsibility and so follow a more regulatory 
path. It promoted the social inclusion role of the non-profit private sector. The 
Programme for Economic and Social Progress (Government of Ireland, 1990) initiated 
the first local Area-Based Partnerships to which the state delegates employment support 
functions including the Local Employment Service. A 1999 White Paper sought to define 
and regulate the relationship between the state and the community and voluntary sector, 
the state has since signalled a shift to service contracts requiring a new model for third-
sector organisations.  NESC (2005a: 206-7) proposes a further shift in governance and 
reinvention of the role of the state away from provision of services to ‘a regulator of 
rights and standards and enabler of local activist networks’. A further but failed example 
of the state’s attempt to divest itself of its traditional social protection role was when a 
proposal to transfer disability protection to employers was blocked by the veto power of 
employers in both 1988 and 1992. This contrasts with the British experience where the 
state was able to transfer this function to private business. Irish government is more 
vulnerable to veto players blocking policy and less able to divest social protection 
functions. 
 
The political process of globalisation changes the nature and role of the state and policy 
contestation. Patterns of governance change, the state plays a more regulatory role and 
power shifts to business and capital. Regular delegation of policy to committees avoids 
communicative public discourse and minimises public debate about values. Changes tend 
to be uncontroversial and mediated, potentially conflictual policies like abolition of pay-
related benefit and taxation of benefits are negotiated in a consensus framework. Roles 
are blurred, social partners chair key state boards, key policy-making functions are 
delegated to private consultancies and agencies, and there are public/private partnerships 
in social services. When consensus is not reached policy tends to be paralysed, childcare 
policy being an obvious example.  
 
Employers and business are major veto players blocking restructuring of disability 
benefits and paid parental leave payments and asserting the needs of international 
competitiveness in a political advocacy coalition with two key Departments (Finance, and 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment). International companies impact on social protection 
by providing private packages that reinforce second-tier market-led social security 
provision; these structurally impact on social protection by changing the context and 
choices around work-related social provision. A further example of international 
organisations becoming more pivotal is the EU procurement process which obliges 
tendering, to private and public bodies, of delivery services previously monopolised by 
statutory bodies (for example An Post’s social security delivery contracts).  
 
There is more overlap between domestic and international policy coalitions, particularly 
in the EU Open Method of Co-ordination across employment policy, social inclusion and 
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pensions policy but also in more regular public discourse with the OECD. The shift from 
the redistributive adequacy agenda of the 1986 Commission on Social Welfare to a more 
productivist policy2 reflected the agenda of the international policy community as 
expressed in the OECD Jobs Study (1995) (concerned with work incentives) and the 
European Employment Strategy (1997) (concerned with activation). In this merged 
public/private and national/international space we see the emergence in Ireland of a 
professional technical elite whose members engage in coordinative discourse at one 
remove from the political realm.    
 
Changing governance means more than a simple delegation of tasks, as renegotiation of 
the relationship between the private and public spheres involves a shift in power. The 
clearest example is perhaps the government invitation to the private pension industry to 
chair the National Pensions Board. It is no coincidence to see private, business-led style 
of governance result in promoting the commodification or privatisation of pensions. 
Strongly advocated by the international financial services sector, the Pensions 
(Amendment) Act 2002 introduced second-tier private Pension Savings Retirement 
Accounts. This policy was chosen in spite of opposition from civil servant advisors 
(disempowered by new forms of governance?). International and national private-sector 
pressures allied to sectors of the state drove the logic behind these moves.  The 
international context was the World Bank’s promotion of a privatisation agenda in 
pension policy.   
 
Consumerism, choice and new public management discourse are evident in the Public 
Services Management Act (1997) and initiatives like ‘customer service plans’, ‘customer 
service targets’, and ‘service delivery models’. A process of ‘expenditure reviews’ 
emphasising value for money has had some impact on policy development; however 
there is considerable resistance to new public management practices and institutional 
change in the Irish public service (NESC, 2002). The capacity of a strong centralised 
bureaucracy to resist change is reinforced by the strength of public sector trade unions to 
veto change. This power has been reinforced through the lack of transparency in how pay 
increases were decided upon as part of the public sector benchmarking process. We can 
conclude that there is strong evidence of the state engaging in a new public management 
ethos of customer-focused delivery but it remains to be seen whether such engagement 
has fundamentally transformed staff and claimant experience of social security delivery.   
 
Retrenchment 
As mentioned earlier, in a competition state we expect a low-tax development model to 
necessitate budgetary constraint and cost containment measures. In the Irish context two 
factors are worth highlighting.  One factor is path dependency. Irish social security policy 
is characterised by a liberal residual welfare state with a high degree of reliance on 
means-tested payments with little room to reduce already ungenerous payments. The 
second factor is Ireland’s exceptional economic performance. Given Ireland’s high 
economic growth rates and limited pressures from an ageing population from the mid 
1990s to the mid 2000s, Ireland not only suffered less fiscal pressure than did other 
OECD countries but had budget surpluses and the capacity to expand social security rates 
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and coverage. That such expansion did not happen is as much part of the story as what 
actually happened. The Irish story is one of arrested development where government 
abstained from using the fruits of economic growth to expand and improve social 
protection to the degree that might have been anticipated in a period of economic growth 
(Alber and Standing, 2000: 99). It is necessary, therefore, to review retrenchment 
experience not only from the perspective of short-term cost cutting but also longer-term 
cost containment and cost avoidance.   
 
Allan and Scruggs (2004) and Korpi and Palme (2003: 441) provide evidence of Irish 
cost cutting. Ireland ranks alongside Britain, New Zealand, Denmark, Canada, the 
Netherlands and the US, as countries that experienced major retrenchment. The social 
protection value of social insurance payments reduced between 1980 and 2000 through 
the abolition of Pay-Related Benefit, the taxation of benefits and restrictions on 
eligibility. There has been less retrenchment of social assistance payments but 
considerable cuts in the safety net Supplementary Welfare Allowance scheme.  Other 
cuts such as the 1994 child-income support reforms which froze the monetary value of 
means-tested child-dependant allowances, reflect policy restructuring motivated by work 
incentives rather than fiscal pressures.3 Two sets of social security cuts, the 1992 ‘Dirty 
Dozen’ and the 2003 ‘Savage Sixteen’, were short-term responses to periods of tight 
fiscal austerity (the 1992 EMU preparations and the post 9/11 recession in 2002-03). 
Both sets of cuts happened when inexperienced first time Ministers were unable to resist 
strong pressure from Department of Finance officials to cut social security budgets. 
These cuts are exceptions that prove the rule. Politicians at all cost seek to avoid blame 
associated with direct social security cuts which, more than any other kind of public 
spending cuts, are transparent to claimants. Experienced Ministers, especially those in 
electoral systems based on proportional representation, know it is politically expedient to 
avoid directly cutting social security (Pierson, 1998).   
 
Less obvious long-term cost-containment policies have had a more serious impact on 
Irish society. The Department of Finance, with its concern for controlling expenditure, 
dominates the setting of social security rates. Proposals in 1998 for a pensions adequacy 
benchmark and in 2001 for an adequacy benchmark for the lowest social assistance 
payments 4 were rejected by an advocacy coalition of  the Department of Finance, 
employers’ representatives and the Department of Enterprise and Employment. They 
were motivated by a combination of future cost containment, maintenance of work 
incentives and ensuring a level of flexibility considered essential to adapt to the global 
economy. More puzzling in the Irish case is the failure in the early 1990s to index earned 
income disregards.5 Freezing income disregards makes work incentive policy less 
effective and is inconsistent with a productivist-focused competition state. Such deviation 
                                                 
3 NESC (2005a: 52) outlines the distributional outcome of this child income support reform. The value of 
child income support for higher income groups receiving only universal child benefit payments increased 
by 173% over the 1994-2004 period while low income families relying on the combined child-dependant 
allowances and child benefit experienced only a 52% increase over the same period. 
4 National Irish Pensions Initiative and PPF Benchmarking and Indexation Working Group 2001 majority 
recommendations 
5 Earned income disregards allow claimants to disregard a certain amount of earnings from social assistance 
means tests and are therefore considered an important welfare-to-work incentive. 
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might be explained by a cost-fixated Department of Finance dominating annual budget 
negotiations.  
 
As well as cost containment there has also been significant ‘cost avoidance’ or resistance 
to accommodate new social risks through the social security system. The significant 
structural increases in labour market participation of women happened without 
substantial social security restructuring to enable such participation or to respond to 
emerging social care needs. Irish social security remains a strong male breadwinner 
regime with structural barriers to women registering as unemployed or accessing labour-
market supports. Reliance on market-led responses to childcare (Government of Ireland, 
2000a) means that childcare subsidies, maternity leave and paid parental leave are 
underdeveloped relative to other countries. Eldercare responses are limited to tax 
incentives to provide private nursing homes.  Failure to individualise social security or to 
introduce child and elder care supports is paradoxical in a competition state aiming to 
increase the labour force participation of mothers. A neo-liberal fixation on limiting state 
intervention is a partial explanation but policy inaction is not just about ideology or cost 
avoidance. Policy paralysis is due to politicians’ fears of introducing reforms in the 
absence of policy consensus and to the political difficulty of mediating between those 
advocating conflicting policy options.6  Policy is also limited by the strong veto power of 
employers who resist parental leave policies. The lack of policy to promote women’s 
economic participation is also due to a deeply rooted ideological ambiguity about 
mothers’ labour-market participation in a conservative, patriarchal political culture 
(McLaughlin, 2001). Finally, cost avoidance can also be seen in recent policy responses 
to inflows of asylum seekers and migrant workers. State policy is to exclude these needs 
from Irish social security and leave migrants to the mercy of the market. Asylum seekers 
are limited to ‘direct provision’ welfare entitlement. Government responded to EU 
enlargement with legislation restricting welfare entitlement to ‘habitual residents’. As a 
result of direct lobbying from international companies, legislation was introduced to 
exempt certain non-EU migrant workers from social insurance coverage. Social security 
policy is therefore actively responding to the needs and desires of international capital.   
 
Residualisation 
Competition state theory anticipates new forms of inequality as well as increased gaps 
between rich and poor. It expects those most distant from the labour market (older 
people, carers, women in the home, lone parents and people with disabilities) to suffer 
most poverty. Here we review Irish trends towards more use of targeted means-tested 
payments, increased relative poverty, and shifts in the risk of relative poverty.  
 
Competition states shift from universal to selective social security payments (Alber and 
Standing, 2000: 101); however already ‘Ireland is exceptional within the EU for the high 
proportion of its social spending which is means tested’ (NESC, 2005a: xvi). Despite 
                                                 
6 Montague (2003) describes three key policy coalitions comprised of the trade union SIPTU and the IBEC 
employers’ confederation lobbying for tax relief, the Open Your Eyes to Child Poverty Initiative lobbying 
for child benefit increases, a Childcare 2000 campaign lobbying for a parental Childcare payment, and 
‘Women in the Home’, a  lobby group campaigning against tax relief. 
 14
employment growth, decreases in unemployment and inward migration of labour, levels 
of dependency on social welfare among the working aged are stubbornly high.7 Such 
path dependency would be reinforced by the NESC recommendation that Ireland 
maintain its hybrid model and reliance on means-tested payments (NESC, 2005a).8 High 
dependency on means-tested payments might not matter if payments were adequate. 
However, Irish policy has always stressed work incentives and low replacement rates, 
and rates are characterised by a minimal subsistence type of support and have been 
allowed to decline relative to average net earnings.9 While consistent deprivation-based 
poverty fell, the inequality indicator or relative income poverty, increased to 21.3 per cent 
(CSO, 2005), the highest relative income poverty in the EU where the average is 15 per 
cent (Eurostat).  
 
Table 4.1 Percentage of persons below 60% of median income by labour force 
status, 1997-2003   
 1994 1997 1998 2000 2001 2003  
Employee 3.2 4.7 2.6 6.5 8.1 9.2 
Self Employed 16.0 14.4 16.4 17.9 14.3 - 
Farmer 18.6 16.7 23.9 24.1 23.0 - 
Unemployed 51.4 57.7 58.8 57.1 44.7 42.1 
Ill/Disabled 29.5 52.5 54.5 52.2 66.5 54.0 
Retired 8.2 13.5 18.4 30.3 36.9 31.0 
Home Duties 20.9 32.6 46.8 44.3 46.9 37.0 
 Source: CSO (2005), European Survey on Income and Living Conditions, First results 2003 
 
Table 4.1 shows the shift in the composition of groups experiencing relative poverty. 
Consistent with what would be expected under a competition state, those outside the 
labour market experience a higher risk of poverty. Unemployment, while still significant, 
is no longer the major risk factor; those with disabilities are now most likely to 
experience poverty (up 24 per cent) and these are closely followed by the aged (up 23 per 
cent) and people in home duties/lone parents (up 16 per cent). Consistent with 
competition state theory on the working poor, those in work experienced a 6 per cent 
increased risk of poverty. The trend is clear. Those relying primarily on social welfare, 
particularly those in receipt of social assistance means-tested payments, are most likely to 
fall below poverty lines linked to average incomes. While fewer people were 
unemployed, the risk of poverty for those remaining unemployed doubled from 23.9 per 
cent in 1994 to 43.1 per cent in 2001, while for older people the risk increased from 5.3 
per cent in 1994 to 49 per cent in 2001 (ESRI, 2003: Table 4.22). This pauperisation of 
segments of society is directly attributable to a conscious policy decision to keep social 
welfare payments low.   
 
                                                 
7 Benefit dependency rose from 12.4% in 1980 to hold constant at 20% for claimants (37% for all adult and 
child recipients) over 1985-2005. 
8 This represents a significant policy shift from the 1986 Commission on Social Welfare consensus 
recommendation to expand social insurance coverage and reduce the use of social assistance payments.  
9 Social welfare increases fell considerably below net increases in earnings over the 1991-2001 period with 
the long-term unemployment assistance payment increasing by 64% compared to net average industrial 
earnings increasing by 109.1% (Government of Ireland,  2001: 46, Table 6.6). 
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Activation/Conditionality  
Irish social security offers less social protection in 2001 than it did in 1994. The 
traditional principle of designing social security to preserve work incentives is now 
underpinned by a new Irish focus on ‘performative inclusion’, which stresses 
employment as the best route out of poverty (Government of Ireland, 1997b). This policy 
direction is reinforced through employment support services (Dukelow, 2004: 16-18) and 
activation policies (McCashin, 2004: 211). This section seeks to establish the particular 
style and scale of Irish commodification by reviewing three key trends: spending on 
active measures, changes in ‘conditionality’ and extension of activation beyond 
unemployed claimants. 
 
In the competition state we expect public investment to shift to active labour market 
spending. Significant active labour market expenditure is a long-standing feature of the 
Irish welfare state.10 Irish spending on active labour market programmes increased from 
an already comparatively high 1.46 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 1.53 percent GDP in 2000 
(a significant real spending increase). Active labour market programmes are administered 
by a number of government departments, such as the Department of Social and Family 
Affairs, the Department of Education and Science and the Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment. Irish active labour market policy has been criticised for a lack of 
focus on progression to employment (Cousins, 2005a).  Boyle explains this as an 
outcome of strong advocacy coalitions, including backbench politicians, supporting the 
social-policy rather than the labour-market aspect of programmes. Over time, the labour-
market focus is gaining the upper hand, while programmes have become more 
progression oriented and linked to participation obligations. Irish institutional experience 
remains differentiated from other liberal welfare regimes by the separation of social 
security administration from active employment services, and further policy development 
in this area seems hampered by institutional competition between key government 
departments. ILO (1999: 4) evaluations highlight how reforms in the delivery of labour 
market policies through local employment services made labour market policies ‘more 
responsive to local enterprise needs’.  
 
Irish social security literature is ambiguous about trends towards greater compulsion. 
McCashin (2004: 220), Van Oorschot (2002), McLaughlin (2001), Boyle (2005: 59), Ó 
Riain and O’Connell (2000: 334), Daly and Yeates (2003: 94), Martin and Grubb (2002) 
and Pearson (2003) all conclude that compulsion is remarkably absent in the Irish policy 
regime relative to more conditional practice in both liberal regimes and small open 
economies. It may be that perceptions are somewhat obscured by the positive discourse in 
social partnership and elsewhere. Empirical evidence, however, supports Taylor’s (2003: 
57) and Dukelow’s (2004: 22) conclusion that policy shows significant supportive and 
punitive changes which, when combined, push welfare claimants towards employment.11  
                                                 
10 As a high net recipient of EU Structural funds, Ireland was required to spend on active labour-market 
policies. 
11 Up to 40 significant punitive or supportive changes took place over the period 1986-2005, some of which 
had a substantial impact on the quality of social protection experienced by the claimant. Negative changes 
included freezing child income support, limiting duration of payments, means-testing insurance payments, 
and restricting part-time workers’ access to insurance payments. 
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Stricter work availability tests were also applied to unemployment payments. Irish social 
policy discourse of ‘supportive conditionality’ and ‘sensitive activation’ masks a harder 
reality.  Historically, job search conditions always applied to unemployment payments 
and Irish policy required limited adjustment to reach a ‘competition state’ level of 
conditionality. The 1987 Jobsearch programme was followed by 1992 legislation 
increasing and broadening the scope of sanctions.  From 1996 onwards fears of labour 
shortages sparked vigorous debate about the need for more conditionality which resulted 
in a new Live Register Management Unit focused on ‘a more effective application of 
conditionality’ (Dukelow, 2004: 22). New regulations to tighten work availability and 
job-seeking guidelines were introduced in 1997 and 1998. Practical use was made of 
these sanctions. Appeals Office data show that since the 1997 National Employment 
Action Plan (NEAP) implemented a policy of systematic engagement with unemployed 
claimants there has been a substantial rise in appeals for loss of payment, with a 47 per 
cent  increase (representing 1,700 extra claimants) in such appeals in 2000.  
 
This stronger style of commodification was introduced through a window of opportunity 
presented in the  European Employment Strategy Open Method of Co-ordination, which 
required each national government to enter into a national policy dialogue and produce a 
National Employment Action Plan to promote activation and other policy. We can see in 
this process how increased links between national and international interests is a factor 
determining policy choice but also how international policy processes shift power at the 
domestic level. In this instance the EU required the more productivist Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) to lead this national policy process. This 
empowered the DETE, giving them some leverage over the Department of Social and 
Family Affairs (DSFA), and it weakened institutional vetoes on conditionality.   
 
Ireland still deviates from a strong model of conditionality in its reluctance to extend 
conditionality to lone parents, spouses of male claimants, and people with disabilities. 
DSFA (2001) argues that reluctance to extend conditionality is due to the lack of a 
coherent childcare infrastructure and of services for people with disabilities.  
Procrastination may also be due to fear of a political backlash from those who might 
conservatively respond to measures designed to deny women their ‘right’ to work in the 
home. The patriarchal culture may not yet be comfortable with measures to promote 
women’s economic participation. The recent NESC (2005a: 178) proposal that all social 
assistance payments enable a ‘lifetime attachment to the labour force’ therefore reflects a 
significant shift in policy consensus. It also reflects DSFA’s own internal reinvention of 
social security and its desire to move from a contingency-structured social security 
regime to one that identifies claimants by reference to their relationship with the labour 
market: claimants are young, old or ‘working age’12.  
 
Conclusion  
                                                 
12 Cousins (2005a) notes the significance of this new focus on ‘working age’. The language, more 
developed in UK policy discourse, is highly ideologically motivated implying that those of working age 
should be at work. He notes the approach has important gender implications placing all working aged 
claimants including mothers, on an employability continuum.  
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The Irish reinvention of social security has its own distinctive style, pace and discourse.  
Social security is still in the process of becoming a ‘tool of commodification’ (Holden, 
2003) and the remaining journey to this recommodified regime will remain slow and 
incremental. There is still a considerable journey to go on the path to a comprehensive 
welfare to work strategy (NESF, 2000: 65). This slow cautious pace of change means 
Irish social security policy has yet to adapt fully to the needs of competitiveness 
(Cousins, 2005a: 339).  The strategically ambivalent, hesitant and nervous discourse in 
NESC (2005a) reflects the challenge in Irish political culture of forging consensus 
between different advocacy coalitions around the remaining Irish recommodification 
project. Earlier we outlined how explanations for particular policy choices can be found 
in the interaction between domestic institutions and practices, national and international 
interest groups and the evolving relationship between the public and private sectors 
(Cerny et al., 2005: 15). We conclude by reflecting how particular Irish political features 
might be explanatory factors for this ‘Irish style’ recommodification.  
 
Path dependence of existing social security institutions has played a key role in 
influencing the trajectory of change and the type of competition state social development 
model that has emerged in Ireland. The Irish social security system has always been well 
targeted and employment focused and so contained elements of a competition state 
regime. The legacy of a strong male breadwinner model combined with patriarchal 
ideologies and opposing political coalitions account for the slow progress in the 
individualisation of social security, the reluctance to extend conditionality to mothers and 
the paralysis in childcare policy. The Irish electoral system based on a single transferable 
vote in multi-seat constituencies makes the electorate a significant veto player. An 
electoral system based on transferring votes between candidates (in many cases of the 
same party) perpetuates a consensus-based political culture biased towards conservative 
and incremental policy development. The trend towards coalition government and social 
partnership reinforces middle ground consensus policy-making and slows down change. 
Government is increasingly reliant on using social partnership as a litmus paper to test for 
consensus.  Lack of consensus is often masked by sensitive but ambiguous discourse. 
Policy shifts are often correlated with international policy community initiatives such as 
the European Employment Strategy.  
 
The inconsistent, slow Irish transformation to date means we should expect more 
recommodification. Given the ambiguous developmental discourse it is less than clear 
what style further recommodification will take. Cerny et al. remind us there is ‘room for 
maneuver’ (2005: 3). Torfing (1999: 24) argues that workfare or activation policy can be 
focused on supportive carrots and be ‘offensive’ like Dutch and Danish policy or can use 
punitive sticks and be ‘defensive’ like UK and  US policy. The former brings more 
equality while the latter results in higher percentages of working poor. The present Irish 
situation with rising inequality and increasing numbers of working poor, while not as 
neo-liberal as in Britain or the US, is clearly far from the Dutch or Danish model. The 
choice for the medium term is which variety of competitive capitalism Ireland wishes to 
follow. Does Ireland wish to reinforce this neo-liberal competition state development 
model or shift to a more egalitarian social democratic state model? The choice for the 
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longer term is whether it is possible to shift to a new global model of development that 
can produce more social, economic and environmentally sustainable outcomes.     
 
The NESC Developmental Welfare State (2005a) represents the latest consensus about 
Irish social development. The NESC proposals straddle two different varieties of the 
competition state. Based on promoting high levels of participation in a rights and 
standards framework of activist measures, it opens up the possibility of an offensive 
model. Certain path dependencies enable a more offensive model to emerge and Ireland 
is institutionally oriented towards an offensive model on two fronts, a tradition of high 
levels of investment in active labour-market training and education, and a separation of 
employment services from surveillance and control functions. However the NESC 
recommendation of adequate but basic welfare generosity locks in the traditional Irish 
dependence on low replacement rates. It is ultimately its more generous payments which 
give the Danish model its equality outcomes.13 The recommendation that ‘payment 
arrangements facilitate employment’ opens up the possibility of conditional and modest 
social welfare payments in a more defensive social development model.  
 
Clearly there is much left to fight for and political agency remains crucial in mediating 
future Irish social security choices.  The Irish style transition to a recommodified 
competition state social security regime is likely to continue to happen in a governance 
style dominated by task forces and working groups and to move in incremental and 
fudged stages.14 The challenge is to create a communicative public debate about the 
desirability of a more fundamental move to a more egalitarian development model with 
higher social welfare rates and adequate state investment in quality activist policies that 
generate more inclusive and equal outcomes.    
 
Conclusions 
This paper has argued that the model of the competition state best characterises the Irish 
state, especially as it has adapted to the pressures and opportunities of globalisation, what 
in the Irish debate is usually labelled the Celtic Tiger period. The paper advanced its case 
both theoretically and empirically. It firstly outlined the ways states are restructuring 
themselves in response to globalisation and identified the concept of the competition state 
as characterising the model of state that is emerging. This concept, it was argued, 
interprets more fully and adequately than do other concepts of state the changing nature 
of state governance in Ireland accounting for the greater state activism and the extension 
                                                 
13 NESC (2005a: 219) recommends that people of working age should receive a ‘basic payment’ to enable a 
‘minimum threshold of income adequacy’ to ‘guarantee them access to the basic necessities of life’. It is 
difficult to interpret as a proposal for generous rates the NAPS target of 150 euro in 2002 terms by 2007 
which it proposes as ‘the minimum justified by the present circumstances’. This persistence with lack of 
generosity differentiates Ireland (with replacement ratios of 24%) from offensive states’ polices 
characterised by high rates of payment (replacement ratios of 89% to 96% for low income groups) (ibid: 
19). 
14 The peculiar mix of Irish institutions and political culture means that debate about Irish social security is 
modest and unambitious. US president Bill Clinton promised the US electorate to ‘end welfare as we know 
it’ and UK prime minister Tony Blair instructed his Minister for Social Security, Frank Fields, to ‘think the 
unthinkable’ In the ‘blame avoidance’ consensus-dominated Irish political culture, Irish Ministers are more 
likely to be told to ‘stay out of trouble’. 
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of state activity over the recent period even as the state hands over more power to private 
market actors. In identifying the imposition of competitive pressures on the economy and 
on society as the central logic informing state actions, the concept of a competition state 
explains better, than do other concepts of state the ambiguities that can be observed 
between the state’s effectiveness in dealing with foreign capital and its ineffectiveness in 
addressing social needs. Finally, the concept of a competition state draws attention to the 
fragmentation of state actions as different agencies are charged with implementing 
different aspects of public policy with little coordination between them. Recognising that 
treatment of the competition state has been largely theoretical, the paper has devoted 
attention to testing its claims empirically through examining the changing nature of the 
Irish social security regime, analysing both the extent to which change has moved in the 
direction of a competition state model and also accounting for the distinctive features of 
what has taken place, what we call commodification ‘Irish-style’.  
 
The empirical section has highlighted the role that agency plays in the outcomes 
observed, drawing attention to the fact that, while the pressures of globalisation are 
moving states more and more away from a welfare or developmental state model and 
towards some form of competition state, there is nothing predetermined about how that 
change happens nor about the form of competition state that emerges. As was pointed out 
in the paper, the state maintains room for manoeuvre to influence distributional outcomes 
in a robust way. What we are witnessing therefore is the emergence of different varieties 
of competition state, just as the era of national capitalism saw many different varieties of 
welfare state – from the activist and egalitarian types to the more passive and residual 
types. However, the evidence also seems to point to the fact that the pressures of 
globalisation lead at this point in time away from the social democratic or developmental 
state and towards some version of the competition state. Whether states can successfully 
and sustainably combine economic competitiveness with generous and effective social 
provision is still unclear. What is clear, however, is that Ireland has opted for a 
particularly ungenerous approach towards social provision. Only time will tell whether 
Irish society has the capacity for the sort of determined political action to move towards a 
more egalitarian form of development even within the confines of the competition state 
model.  
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